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Multiple Choice Minority Game
F. K. Chow and H. F. Chau
Department of Physics, University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam Road, Hong Kong
(Dated: October 25, 2018)
Minority game is a model of heterogeneous players who think inductively. In this game, each
player chooses one out of two alternatives every turn and those who end up in the minority side
wins. It is instructive to extend the minority game by allowing players to choose one out of many
alternatives. Nevertheless, such an extension is not straight-forward due to the difficulties in finding
a set of reasonable, unbiased and computationally feasible strategies. Here, we propose a variation of
the minority game where every player has more than two options. Results of numerical simulations
agree with the expectation that our multiple choices minority game exhibits similar behavior as the
original two-choice minority game.
PACS numbers: 05.65.+b, 02.50Le, 05.40.-a, 87.23.Ge
I. INTRODUCTION
Complex adaptive systems have drawn attention
among statistical physicists in recent years. The study
of such systems not only provides invaluable insight into
the non-trivial global behavior of a population of com-
peting agents, but also has potential application in eco-
nomics, biology and finance. Moreover, we can study
complex adaptive systems from the perspective of statis-
tical physics.
The El Farol bar problem [1], which was proposed by
W. B. Arthur in 1994, has greatly influenced and stimu-
lated the study of complex adaptive systems in the last
few years. It describes a system of N agents deciding in-
dependently in each week whether to go to a bar or not on
a certain night. As space is limited, the bar is enjoyable
only if it is not too crowded. Agents are not allowed to
communicate directly with each other and their choices
are not affected by previous decisions. The only public
information available to agents is how many agents came
in last week. To enjoy an uncrowded bar, each agent has
to employ some hypotheses or mental models to guess
whether one should go or not. With bounded rationality,
all agents use inductive reasoning rather than perfect, de-
ductive reasoning since the system is ill-defined. In other
words, agents act upon their currently most credible hy-
pothesis based on the past performance of their hypothe-
ses. Consequently, agents can interact indirectly with
each other through their hypotheses in use. The emerg-
ing system is thus both evolutionary and complex adap-
tive in the presence of those inductive reasoning agents.
Inspired by the El Farol bar problem, Challet and
Zhang put forward the Minority Game (MG) [2, 3]. It is
a toy model of N inductive reasoning players who have to
choose one out of two alternatives independently at each
time step. Those who end up in the minority side (that
is, the choice with the least number of players) win. The
only public information available to all players in the MG
is the winning alternatives of the last M passes, known
as the history. Players have to employ some strategies
based on the history to guess the winning choice. In fact,
they may employ more than one strategy throughout the
game. More precisely, every player picks once and for
all S randomly drawn strategies from a suitably chosen
strategy space before playing the game. The performance
of each strategy will be recorded during the game. Then
players make decision according to their current best per-
forming strategy at every time step.
In spite of its simplicity, MG displays a remarkably
rich emergent collective behavior. Numerical simulations
showed that there is a second order phase transition
between a symmetric phase and an asymmetric phase
[4, 5, 6]. There is no predictive information about the
next minority group available to agent’s strategies in the
symmetric phase, whereas there is predictive information
available to agent’s strategies in the asymmetric phase.
MG addresses the interaction between agents and public
information, that is, how agents react to public informa-
tion and how the feedback modify the public informa-
tion itself. Later works revealed that the dynamics of
the system in fact minimizes a global function related to
market predictability [7, 8]. Therefore, the MG can be
described as a disordered spin system [7, 8]. Hart and
his coworkers found that the fluctuations arising in the
MG is controlled by the interplay between crowds of like-
minded agents and their anti-correlated partners [9, 10].
Since MG is a prototype to study detailed pattern of fluc-
tuations, it plays a dominant role in economic activities
like the market mechanism. In order to learn more on
MG-like systems, much effort was put on the extension
of the MG model, such as the introduction of evolution
[11] and the modification of MG for modelling the real
market [12, 13].
In the real world, however, an agent usually has more
than two options. For example, people decide where to
dine or which share to buy from a stock market. Con-
sequently, it is worthwhile to investigate the situation
where players have more than two choices especially when
the number of choices is large. Indeed, D’Hulst and
Rodgers [14] has written a paper on the three-choice mi-
nority game. In their paper, a symmetric and an asym-
metric three-sided models are introduced. Their sym-
metric model is only a model which mimics the cyclic
trading between three players using the same strategy
2formalism as MG and thus cannot be extended to real-
istic cases with a large number of choices. Furthermore,
their asymmetric model is nothing but the original mi-
nority game with the possibility allowing players not to
participate in a turn. Hence, the player’s choice is not
symmetric.
Recently, Ein-Dor et al. proposed a multichoice mi-
nority game based on neural network [15]. Their model
generalizes the El Farol bar problem to the case of multi-
ple choice. Nevertheless, it differs quite significantly from
the MG of Challet and Zhang as each player has only one
strategy to use and that strategy evolves according to its
performance. Besides, no phase transition of any kind
is observed in Ein-Dor et al.’s model. Chau and Chow
also proposed another multichoice minority game model
based on MG [16]. In this model, players choosing their
strategies from a reduced strategy space consists of anti-
correlated and uncorrelated strategies only.
In this paper, we propose a new model called the mul-
tiple choices minority game (MCMG) with a neural net-
work flavor. It is a variation of the MG where all hetero-
geneous, inductive thinking players have more than two
choices. Just like the original MG, strategies in MCMG
are not evolving and they are picked in each turn ac-
cording to their current performance. In Section II, the
MCMG model are explained in detail. Results of numer-
ical simulation of our model are presented and discussed
in Section III. We also compare our results with those of
the original MG as well. In the Section IV, we deliver a
brief summary and an outlook of our work.
II. THE MODEL
Let us consider a repeated game of a population of N
players. At each time step, every players has to choose
one of Nc rooms/choices independently. Here, we assume
that Nc is a prime power and we identify the Nc rooms
with elements in the finite field GF (Nc). We represent
the choice of the ith player at time t by χi(t) which only
“takes on” the Nc different rooms. Those players in the
room with the least number of players, that is, in the
minority side, win. The winning room at time t is the
publicly known output of the game Ω(t). The players of
the winning room will gain one unit of wealth while all
the others lose one. So the wealth of the ith player, wi(t),
is updated by
wi(t+ 1) = wi(t) + 2δ(χi(t)− Ω(t))− 1, (1)
where δ(0) = 1 and δ(x) = 0 whenever x 6= 0. Note
that the output of the last M steps, µ(t) ≡ (Ω(t −M +
1), . . . ,Ω(t− 1)), is the only public information available
to all players. Therefore, players can only interact indi-
rectly with each other through the history µ(t) which can
take on NMc different values.
Aimed at maximizing one’s own wealth, each player
has to employ some strategies to predict the trend of the
output of the game. But how to define a strategy? For
a minority game with more than two choices, it is not
effective to formulate the strategy as in MG. Recall that
in MG, a strategy is defined as a number of set of choices
corresponding to different histories. In other words, a
strategy is a map sending each µ(t) to the choice 0/1.
Therefore, there are 22
M
different strategies in the full
strategy space for MG.
Similar numerical results of the fluctuation arising in
the MG are obtained if strategies are drawn from the re-
duced strategy space instead of the full strategy space
[2, 4]. Hence, the reduced strategy space plays a fun-
damental role in the properties of the fluctuation aris-
ing in the MG. The reduced stratgey space is formed
by strategies which are significantly different from each
other. Given a strategy s, only its uncorrelated and anti-
correlated strategies are significantly different from it.
Indeed, the reduced strategy space is composed of two
ensembles of mutually uncorrelated strategies where the
anti-correlated strategy of any strategy in one ensemble
always exists in the other ensemble. For MG, there are
2M+1 different strategies in the reduced strategy space
[2, 4].
For a minority game with Nc rooms using the form
of strategy in MG, there are N
NM
c
c different strategies in
the full strategy space while there are NM+1c different
strategies in the reduced strategy space provided that
Nc is a prime power. Because the strategy space size
increases rapidly as Nc increases, strategies will quickly
get out of control for large Nc. Consequently, we would
like to define the strategy in a different way.
In our game, we do not restrict players to have only
“good strategies” since each player (who thinks induc-
tively) does not know whether a strategy is good or not
before commences the game. “Good strategy” is time
dependent. In fact, players will adapt with each other
in order to use those “good strategies”. Therefore, all
strategies must be uniform in the following sense:
1) any input µ(t) can produce any output χi(t),
2) there are same probability for any output produced
by any input.
Indeed, it is not completely clear that whether those
strategies used in the Ein-Dor et al.’s model are uni-
form in the above sense. With the above consideration, a
strategy s consists of weights (ωs1, . . . , ω
s
M ) ∈ GF (Nc)
M
and a uniform random variable called bias ρs ∈ GF (Nc)
satisfying the following condition:
M∑
j=1
ωsj = η (2)
where η is a fixed constant in GF (Nc). Note that all
the arithemetic used to generate a strategy and the cor-
responding choice (including Eq. (2) above and Eq. (3)
below) are performed in the finite field GF (Nc). The
choice is defined to be the sum of the weighted sum of
the last M output plus the bias. Namely, the choice of
3the ith player using the strategy s with history µ(t) is
given by:
χ
µ(t)
i,si(t)
= ρs +
M∑
j=1
ωsjΩ(t− j) (3)
Physically, the weight ωsj represents the importance of
the output of the game of jth pass before on the choice.
It is obvious that the strategies of MCMG all fulfil the
uniform criteria which was mentioned before.
Since the weights of a strategy are M independent
variable in GF (Nc) which satisfy a single constraint,
namely Eq. (2), there are NM−1c different combinations
of weights ωsj . Moreover, it can be shown that strategies
with the same set of weights are anti-correlated with each
other while the others are uncorrelated with each other
(see Ref. [16]). Hence, it follows that both the full and
reduced strategy space size in MCMG is equal to NMc .
Thus, the strategy space size of MCMG is much smaller
than that of MG.
In our model, every player picks and sticks to S ran-
domly drawn strategies before commences the game. We
denote the strategies of the ith player by (s
(i)
1 , . . . , s
(i)
S ).
But how does a player decide which strategy is the best?
Players use the virtual score, which is just the hypothet-
ical profit for using a single strategy in the game, to es-
timate the performance of a strategy. In each pass, the
virtual score of a strategy s of the ith player, U is(t), is
updated by
U is(t) = U
i
s(t− 1) + 2δ(χ
µ(t)
i,s − Ω(t))− 1 (4)
where χ
µ(t)
i,s is the choice of the ith player under history
µ(t) using the strategy s. Each player uses one’s own
strategy with the highest virtual score. Although our
MCMGmodel is quite similar to the MGmodel, there are
two main differences, namely, in the number of choices of
players and in the formalism of strategies.
In our game, the aim of each player is to maximize
one’s own wealth which can be in turn achieved by the
maximization of the global profit. So the quantity of
interest is
σ2j = 〈(Aj(t))
2〉 − 〈Aj(t)〉
2
≡ 〈(Aj(t)−N/Nc)
2〉, (5)
namely, the variance of the attendance of room j, where
the attendance of a room is just the number of people
chosen that room. Indeed, the maximum global profit
will be achieved if and only if the largest possible minority
size ⌊N/Nc⌋ is attained. So the expected attendance of
all rooms should be equal to N/Nc for players to gain
as much as possible. Accordingly, the variance of the
attendance of a room represents the loss of players in the
game.
In order to investigate the significance of the strategies,
we would like to compare the variance with the coin-toss
case value in which all the players make their decision
simply by tossing an unbiased coin. It is easy to check
that the probability for the attendance Aj(t) equal to x
in the coin-toss case is given by
p(Aj(t) = x) =
NCx(Nc − 1)
N−x∑N
x=1
NCx(Nc − 1)N−x
, (6)
where NCx = N !/[x!(N − x)!]. So the expectation of Aj
and Aj
2 in the coin-toss case are given by
〈Aj〉 =
∑N
x=1 x
NCx(Nc − 1)
N−x∑N
x=1
NCx(Nc − 1)N−x
(7)
and
〈Aj
2〉 =
∑N
x=1 x
2 NCx(Nc − 1)
N−x∑N
x=1
NCx(Nc − 1)N−x
. (8)
III. RESULTS OF NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
In all the simulations, each set of data was taken for
1,000 independent runs. In each run, we took the aver-
age values on 15,000 steps after running 10,000 steps for
equilibrium starting from initialization.
A. Comparison of two-room MCMG with MG
We first want to investigate if the performance of play-
ers are different in MG and the two-room MCMG. We
applied the two models to study the properties of the
mean attendance as a function of the control parameter
α as shown in figure 1. The control parameter α mea-
sures the ratio of the reduced strategy space size to the
number of strategies at play. Specifically, α = 2M+1/NS
for the MG and α = NMc /NS for the MCMG. We have
only studied the properties of the attendance of one of
the rooms as the attendance of the two rooms have the
same behavior due to symmetry [1].
In both MG and the two room MCMG, the mean at-
tendance always fluctuates around the expected value
N/2 no matter how large is the control parameter (see fig-
ure 1). Therefore, we believe that players have the same
performance in both MG and the two room MCMG if we
only consider the mean attendance. To further investi-
gate the difference of the performance of players in MG
and the two-room MCMG, we studied the variance of the
attendance as a function of the control parameter which
was shown in figure 2.
Before making comparsion with that in the MCMG,
let us first take a brief review on the properties of the
variance in MG as shown in figure 2 [4, 5, 6]. In MG,
there is a great variance σ2 when the control parameter α
is small. It is because players use very similar strategies
when the reduced strategy space size (= 2M+1) is much
smaller than the number of strategies at play (= NS).
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FIG. 1: The mean attendance 〈A〉 versus the control param-
eter α in MG and MCMG with Nc = 2 where N = 101.
Such overcrowding of strategies will lead to small mi-
nority size and also great fluctuation of the attendance.
When the reduced strategy space size increases, the vari-
ance decreases rapidly since players are able to cooper-
ate more with less overcrowding effect. Subsequently, the
variance attains a minimum when the number of strate-
gies at play is approximately equal to the reduced strat-
egy space size. In fact, maximum cooperation is attained
when all the strategies in the reduced strategy space are
used by players. As the slope of the variance changes
discontinuously at the minimum point, it strongly sug-
gests that there is a second order phase transition. The
phase transition was also confirmed by analytical method
[7, 17]. After the minimum point, the variance increases
and gradually tends to the coin-toss case value when the
control parameter α increases further. It is due to more
and more insufficient sampling of the reduced strategy
space when the reduced strategy space size become much
and much larger than the number of strategies at play.
Consequently, there is less and less difference between
choosing by random or using strategies. In addition, the
properties of the variance are found to be similar for dif-
ferent number of strategies S.
For the MCMG, the variance of the attendance of a
room, σ2, exhibits similar behavior as a function of the
control parameter α (= NMc /NS for MCMG) to that in
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FIG. 2: The variance σ2 versus the control parameter α in
MG and MCMG with Nc = 2 where N = 101.
MG no matter what the number of strategies S is. For
example, the variance tends to the coin-toss case value
for sufficiently large control parameter. Moreover, there
is again an indication of a second order phase transition.
To check if the phase transition is second order or not,
we calculate the order parameter [7, 16]
θ =
1
NMc
∑
µ
{∑
Ω
[
〈p(Ω|µ)〉 −
1
Nc
]2}
(9)
where 〈p(Ω|µ)〉 denotes the conditional time average of
the probability for Ω(t) = Ω given that µ(t) = µ. In
fact, the order parameter measures the bias of player’s
decision to any choice for individual history.
Figure 3 shows that the order parameter vanishes when
the control parameter is smaller than its value corre-
sponding to minimum variance. As a result, we confirm
that the phase transition is a second order one. Although
our two-room MCMG model does not exactly coincide
with the MG model, the variance has almost the same
properties as a function of the control parameter in both
models. However, the behaviour of the variance as a
function of the memory size M are different in MG and
MCMG because the reduced strategy space size are dif-
ferent in the two models.
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FIG. 3: The order parameter θ versus the control parameter
α in MCMG with Nc = 2 where M = 6.
B. The attendance of different rooms in MCMG
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FIG. 4: The mean attendance 〈Aj〉 of different rooms versus
the control parameter α in MCMG with Nc = 3 where S = 2
and N = 101.
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FIG. 5: The variance σ2j of different rooms versus the control
parameter α in MCMG with Nc = 3 here S = 2 and N = 101.
Here, we want to study if the properties of the at-
tendance of different rooms are different or not in the
MCMG. Figures 4 and 5 show the mean attendance and
the variance of the attendance of different rooms versus
the control parameter α.
We found that the behavior of the attendance of dif-
ferent rooms are almost the same in MCMG with Nc ≥ 2
because there is same probability for any choice to be the
minority side. As we only want to focus on the study of
the attendance of a room, not on their high order corre-
lation, so we will stick to one of them from now on.
C. The attendance in MCMG with different Nc
Now, we investigate the properties of the attendance
for MCMG with different number of rooms Nc. Figure 6
depicts the dependence of the mean attendance on the
control parameter α for MCMG with Nc = 3 to 7. In
MCMG with different Nc, the mean attendance fluctu-
ates around N/Nc irrespective of the control parameter
α. It is resonable as the maximum global profit will be
achieved if and only if the largest possible minority size
⌊N/Nc⌋ is attained.
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FIG. 6: The mean attendance 〈A〉 versus the control param-
eter α in MCMG with different Nc where S = 2.
We also studied the dependence of the variance of the
attendance on the control parameter α for MCMG with
Nc = 3 to 7 as shown in figure 7. In this figure, we
have divided the variance by N/Nc (≈ largest possible
minority size) in order to have an objective comparison
of the variance for different Nc.
No matter what is the value of Nc, there is always
a cusp of the variance which strongly suggests the oc-
curence of a second order phase transition (see fig-
ure 7). We calculate the order parameter θ (introduced
in Eq.(10)) to identify the order of the phase transition
as shown in figure 8. In MCMG with different Nc, the
order parameter vanishes when the control parameter is
smaller than its value at the cusp. Therefore, we conclude
that there is a second order phase transition in MCMG
with different Nc.
Moreover, the variance tends to a constant value when
the control parameter α → ∞. But is such a constant
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FIG. 7: The variance σ2 versus the control parameter α in
MCMG with different Nc where S = 2.
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FIG. 8: The order parameter θ versus the control parameter
α in MCMG with different Nc where S = 2.
value consistent with the coin-toss case value as in MG?
Table 1 shows the value of σ2 at α ≈ 100 in contrast with
the coin-toss case value for MCMG with different Nc.
TABLE I: The value of the variance σ2 at α ≈ 100 and the
coin-toss limit value in MCMG with differentNc where S = 2.
Nc σ
2 at α ≈ 100 coin-toss limit
3 0.217 ± 0.010 0.2222
4 0.184 ± 0.008 0.1875
5 0.156 ± 0.007 0.1600
7 0.120 ± 0.006 0.1224
It was shown clearly that the two values agree with
each other. In other words, the variance does tend to the
coin-toss case value as α → ∞ in MCMG with different
Nc. As a result, we conclude that the variance in MCMG,
no matter what Nc is, has very similar properties with
respect to the control parameter as in MG.
Since the variance shows a second order phase tran-
sition, it is instructive to investigate if αo, the value of
α corresponding to minimum σ2, depends on Nc or not.
The relationship between the minimum variance σ2o and
Nc is also worth to study. We estimated the value of αo
and σ2o by polynomial interpolation around the point of
minimum variance. The error of αo and σ
2
o was estimated
to be the difference of the value of αo and σ
2
o found for
different degrees of interpolation.
TABLE II: The estimated minimum variance σ2o and corre-
sponding αo in MCMG with different Nc where S = 2.
Nc αo σ
2
o/(N/Nc)
3 0.574 ± 0.007 0.274 ± 0.001
4 0.415 ± 0.009 0.272 ± 0.002
5 0.331 ± 0.001 0.283 ± 0.002
7 0.308 ± 0.013 0.318 ± 0.002
Table 2 summarises the estimated values of αo and
σ2o for different Nc. The estimated values of αo and σ
2
o
against Nc with fixed memory size M are also shown
in figure 9. We again divided the variance by N/Nc in
order to have an objective comparision of the variance
for different Nc.
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FIG. 9: Estimated values of αo and σ
2
o in MCMG with dif-
ferent Nc where S = 2.
We found that in MCMG, αo decreases asNc increases.
We may explain this phenomenon as follows: For MCMG
with more number of rooms, more strategies at play are
required such that players can use all the strategies in the
7reduced strategy space. Since maximum cooperation is
attained when all the strategies in the reduced strategy
space are used by players, so the value of αo is larger for
MCMG with more number of rooms. We also found that
the scaled variance σ2o/(N/Nc) increases as Nc increases.
It is due to the increase of difficulty for players to co-
operate with each other when there are more choices for
them.
On the other hand, we also studied the behavior of
the attendance as a function of the control parameter α
in MCMG with different number of strategies S. Fig-
ures 10 and 11 display the results for Nc = 3. The two
figures indicate that the behavior of the attendance as a
function of the control parameter α for different number
of strategies S are similar, just like the case of MG and
MCMG with Nc = 2. In conclusion, the attendance in
MCMG has very similar properties with respect to the
control parameter as in MG no matter how many choices
and strategies players have.
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FIG. 10: The mean attendance 〈A〉 versus the control param-
eter α in MCMG with Nc = 3 where N = 101.
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FIG. 11: The variance σ2 versus the control parameter α in
MCMG with Nc = 3 where N = 101.
D. Comparison of player’s wealth for different Nc
We proceed to study the properties of player’s wealth
in the MCMG. The mean and maximum player’s wealth
as a function of the control parameter α for Nc = 3 to 7
were shown in figures 12 and 13.
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FIG. 12: Comparison of the mean player’s wealth versus the
control parameter α in MCMG with different Nc where S = 2.
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FIG. 13: Comparison of the maximum player’s wealth versus
the control parameter α in MCMG with different Nc where
S = 2.
From figures 12 and 13, we notice that player’s wealth
displays similar behavior for MCMG with different num-
ber of rooms Nc. When the reduced strategy space size
is much smaller than the number of strategies at play,
the mean player’s wealth remains almost constant as the
control parameter α increases. When α is small, the sys-
tem is in the overcrowding phase where all the rooms
8have the same chance to “win”. Therefore, all the play-
ers, on average, always win the same number of times
and make the same amount of profit for small α. Then
the mean player’s wealth attains a maximum value near
the point of minimum variance when the reduced strat-
egy space size is approximately equal to the number of
strategies at play. If the control parameter α increases
further, the number of players N is comparable to the
number of rooms Nc. Thus, finite size effect is impor-
tant. In this case, some of the rooms will have a higher
chance to “win”. Then some of the players will always
lose while some of them will always win in the game. As
a result, the mean player’s wealth decreases rapidly when
the control parameter α increases further.
The properties of the maximum player’s wealth is sim-
ilar to the mean player’s wealth except there is a sig-
nificant peak correponding to maximum cooperation of
players. Although players on average always perform
the same for small α, but the smart players can per-
form much better when the small control parameter α in-
creases. Therefore, those smart players is wealthier when
the control parameter α→ 1+.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Although the MCMG and MG models are not exactly
the same, our work shows that the attendance of a room
in MCMG has similar behavior to that in MG as a func-
tion of the control parameter. Besides, we found that the
attendance of different rooms displays almost the same
behavior in MCMG with number of choices Nc ≥ 2.
Moreover, we observed that both the attendance and
player’s wealth displays similar properties as a function
of the control parameter in MCMG with different Nc. As
all the above mentioned features can be explained reason-
ably, so we concluded that we have successfully built a
computationally feasible model of multi-choice minority
game — MCMG.
Various extensions of the MCMG model could be stud-
ied. For example, the multi-choice game with zero-sum
and the multi-room game with agents who can invest
different amount. We hope the study of the extensions
of the MCMG model can give us more insight on more
realistic complex adaptive system.
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